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Limping marriages: a problem cured or
hidden?
Sofia Gondal, Lecturer at City University, London, Barrister, Great James
Street Chambers
Sofia Gondal is a Barrister at Great James Street
Chambers, London, specializing in immigration,
asylum and human rights law. She is also a
Lecturer on the Bar Vocational Studies course at
City, University of London.
This article analyses the problem of ‘limping
marriages’ in the UK. With no reliable data,
the focus is on Muslim women as research
suggests some may be impacted more than
others, arising from their need for a
religious divorce. It is argued that the law
on the recognition of overseas divorces, the
Family Law Act 1986, lacks clarity, leading
to unjust outcomes for some and has thus
failed in its policy aim to protect women.
An argument for reform is made based on
the rationale underlying private international
law: justice between parties.
A limping marriage
A ‘limping marriage’ is a marriage which is
valid in one country but not in another.1
Problems occur for some women who are
unable to enter into new relationships, as
the overseas divorce has not been
recognised, thus leaving them in a limping
marriage and often with no choice but to
enter into a religious – only ceremony in the
UK. Also, there are women who enter into a
new relationship with a non-EU national,
and then face difficulties when sponsoring
their partner to join them in the UK, such as
in the case of Baig,2 discussed below. A
number of cases also illustrate the problem
of transnational divorces, where the steps of
the religious divorce are begun in one
country and completed in another, for
example, the UK and then Pakistan or
Israel.3 This can also lead to a limping
marriage.
The Family Law Act 1986 (‘the Act’)
determines when a divorce obtained in a
country outside the UK and the EU, which
is legally valid in that country (‘overseas
divorce’) can be recognised in the UK. The
problem of limping marriages has arisen
because the law has adopted an increasingly
restrictive approach to the recognition of
overseas divorces. In Lachaux v Lachaux
[2019] EWCA Civ 738, it was submitted to
the Court of Appeal that the Act was
created to prevent limping marriages. This
may have been the stated policy behind the
legislation but it has had the reverse effect,4
as the avoidance of limping marriages is
‘primarily achieved by the recognition of
overseas divorces rather than the
non-recognition’5.
The scale and impact of limping
marriages
Pearl and Menski raised the issue of limping
marriage over twenty years ago.6 The scale
of the problem for women in limping
marriages (also referred to as chained wives
or anchored women), has not been
researched, so it is unclear which
1 AV Dicey and L Collins: Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th ed. Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2012)
1–044, 18–163
2 Baig (Immigration – Validity of Pakistani Divorce) Pakistan [2002] UKIAT 04229
3 R v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages ex p. Minhas [1977] QB 1 325, R v Secretary of State For the
Home Department Ex Parte Fatima [1986] 2 FLR 294, Berkovitz v Grinberg (Attorney-General Intervening) [1995] 1
FLR 477.
4 D Pearl and W Menski, Muslim Family Law. London (3rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1998), p 101
5 (n4) Moylan LJ para 173; Law Commission, Private International Law: Recognition of Foreign Nullity Decrees (Law
Com No 137, 1984) paragraph 2.40
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communities are implicated and to what
extent. However, research suggests Muslim
women may be impacted more than others.7
Caselaw on the issue has also mainly
involved Muslim parties. The lack of recent
cases in immigration law in particular, may
suggest the Muslim community has rid itself
of the problem of limping marriages.8 With
no data available, one can only speculate
that this may be due to greater awareness
amongst both the community and legal
advisors. Or, more likely, the problem has
shifted elsewhere and hidden itself as a
result of the increasingly restrictive approach
of the law towards overseas divorces over
the decades.
In order to understand the impact of the law
on Muslim women, it is necessary to
understand the personal law context. There
are a number of ways in which a Muslim
couple can dissolve a marriage according to
Muslim personal law (sharia law). A
detailed explanation is beyond the scope of
the article. In brief, dissolution can be
extra-judicial, by agreement of both parties
or by application to a sharia law body.9 It is
the extra-judicial method that has generated
the most interest outside the Muslim
community due to its unilateral effect and,
in the case of the bare talaq, (husband
pronounced, irrevocable divorce with no
court involvement), the perceived prejudice
against women.
There are three possible routes for women
who are involuntarily stuck in limping
marriages. Firstly, women may have
terminated limping marriages by seeking a
civil divorce in court, despite their
uncertainty regarding the law, delays and
concerns regarding costs,10 before entering
into a new relationship. Following this, they
may have also sought a khula or mubarah
(wife’s application for a divorce) from a
sharia council.11 The increase in demand for
sharia councils’ services has been widely
researched by Bano and others.12 Home
Office publication, Report of the
Independent Review into the Application of
Sharia Law in England and Wales found
that nearly all of the petitioners in the sharia
councils were women and over 90% were
seeking a divorce.13 This may relate in some
cases to foreign divorces but without any
data, again, this is not clear. The Home
Office report did not investigate the use of
sharia councils by women where there is a
transnational element, despite a call in 2017
by a leading academic in the field for
research on this issue.14 Secondly, as
mentioned above, women may be remaining
in a limping marriage, as the overseas
divorce in their view is a valid religious
divorce and then enter into a religious-only
marriage in the UK. This would mean loss
of protection under civil law if the
relationship were to break down (such as
ancillary relief, property, child custody and
inheritance rights). The Home Office report
also failed to investigate what proportion of
women using the sharia councils had not
undergone a civil marriage and as a result
were in unregistered relationships. In the
absence of reliable data, the estimated
figures show 75–80% of Muslim marriages
in the UK being unregistered.15 Finally, a
number of women may be travelling to the
relevant overseas country to finalise the
divorce proceedings in personal law fora,
7 I Uddin, ‘British-Bangladeshi Muslim women and divorce in the UK’ (Unpublished paper, Middlesex University, 2018)
101. Uddin interviewed 27 British Bangladeshi Muslim women, of which 14 said they had undergone a transnational
marriage, of which half said they travelled abroad to marry.
8 F Sona ‘Defending the Family Treasure Chest: Navigating Muslim Families and Secured Positivistic Islands of European
Legal Systems’ in Shah, Foblets and Rohe, (eds.) Family, religion and law: Cultural encounters in Europe (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2014) p.135
9 Pearl and Menski (n5) 283.
10 Uddin ( n8) p 147
11 Sona (n9) p 135; Uddin ( n8) 164, 234
12 S Bano, ‘Sharia Courts in Relation to Divorce within the Muslim Community in Britain’ (Unpublished paper, University
of Warwick, 2003; I Uddin, (n10)
13 Home Office, Report of the Independent Review into the Application of Sharia Law in England and Wales’
13 (Cm 9560, 2018) page 5.
14 Shah P, ‘South Asian Legal Systems and Families in Foreign Courts: The British Case’ in: Garimella, Ramani and Jolly
(eds), Private International Law and South Asian States’ Practice (Springer, Singapore, 2017) 3–18, p.16
15 Uddin (n8) 44
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but this has been found to be unpopular,
with women citing fear and discomfort.16
This would clearly also incur expense and
time. Despite the restrictions of the law,
Muslim women appear to be finding
avenues, or ‘navigation strategies’17 that
allow them to move on with their lives
following divorce.
Development of the law
The position of the current law is best
understood from a brief consideration of its
development over time. Historically, in
divorce matters, the common law considered
the question of jurisdiction by reference to
domicile.18 Throughout the 19th and early
20th centuries, overseas divorces were
recognised under English law applying these
principles of private international law. The
pinnacle of this ‘liberal’ approach came with
the case of Qureshi v. Qureshi.19 In this
case, a talaq pronounced in England was
recognised as valid where the husband was
found to be domiciled in Pakistan.
The approach under the common law was
then curbed by statute based on public
policy grounds. The first statute, aimed to
consolidate the existing common law into
one, comprehensive statute for the entire
United Kingdom,20 was the Recognition of
Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971
(‘the 1971 Act’). This implemented the
Hague Convention on the Recognition of
Divorces and Legal Separations 1970.
During passage of the Bill, the Lord
Chancellor said that a principal aim was to
reduce limping marriages.21 Section 2 stated
that overseas divorces shall be recognised in
the UK if obtained by ‘judicial or other
proceedings’ in a country where either
spouse is a national or habitually resident.
This required formal proceedings, either
before a court or another, impartial body
recognised by the state for that purpose
(such as the Union Council, in Pakistan).
Section 6 preserved the common law
grounds and accorded recognition to an
overseas divorce if obtained in the country
of domicile. However, s 8(2) gave the court
discretion to refuse to recognise such a
divorce on public policy grounds, if the
other spouse had not been given notice of
the divorce nor the opportunity to be
involved in the proceedings. This effectively
prevented recognition of the talaq where
there was no court involvement or notice to
the spouse. The House of Lords in Quazi v.
Quazi22 held that a talaq pronounced in
Pakistan in accordance with the
requirements of the Muslim Family Law
Ordinance 1961 (‘MFLO 1961’), was valid
under of the 1971 Act as ‘proceedings’, as it
included notification to the Chairman of the
Union Council. The court took a pragmatic
approach, in line with the policy behind the
1971 Act, focusing on the need to avoid
limping marriages (per Lord Diplock).
Then followed another statutory provision,
the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings
Act 1973 (‘the 1973 Act’). This restricted
s 6 of the 1971 Act by adding that such a
divorce would not be recognised if both
parties were habitually resident in the UK (s
16(2)(c)).
The policy of law was to prevent ‘talaq
tourism’ (British residents going overseas for
the main purpose of securing a divorce) and
to safeguard women’s financial rights,23 as
illustrated in cases such as: Chaudhry v.
Chaudhry24 (where a talaq carried out in
accordance with the law of Azad Kashmir
was denied recognition), as reiterated by the
16 Ibid 159,162
17 Sona (n9) 116, 135.
18 Armitage v Att. Gen [1906] P 135; Le Mesurier v Le Mesurier [1895] AC 517
19 [1971] 1 All ER 325
20 Law Commission (n6) para 7.2




22 Quazi v Quazi [1980] AC 744
23 (n9) p.134
24 Chaudhary v Chaudhary [1985] FLR 476
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House of Lords in Ghulam Fatima.25 Pearl
and Menski noted the ‘hostile’ and
‘offensive’ tone of the court and predicted
this would lead to British Muslims seeking
resolution of family law matters through
informal fora.26
The current law: The Family Law Act
1986
At a second reading of the Bill in the Lords,
the Solicitor General stated that the policy
of the proposed legislation was to counter
the discriminatory effect of talaq and other
extra-judicial divorce against women.27 The
Act came into force on the 4th April 1988.
Part II amended the law on the recognition
of overseas divorces by repealing the 1971
Act and repealing the relevant provisions of
the 1973 Act. It introduced an effective
blanket ban on the recognition of
extra-judicial divorces in s 44(1), despite no
such recommendation from the Law
Commission. Also, the distinction between
bare and procedural talaqs, established by
caselaw, continued.28 Section 44(1) reads:
‘No divorce or annulment obtained in
any part of the British Islands shall be
regarded as effective in any part of the
United Kingdom unless granted by a
court of civil jurisdiction’.
Section 46 sets out the grounds on which a
foreign divorce may be recognised under
English law. Section 46(1) of the Act states
that if a divorce is obtained overseas by
‘proceedings’ [which means judicial or other
proceedings under s 54(1)], then in order for
it to be recognised in the UK it must be
shown that:
• it is effective under the law of the
country in which it was obtained; and
• at the relevant date either party was
habitually resident, domiciled in or a
national of that country at the time
proceedings were begun.
Under s 46(2), a non-proceedings divorce
will only be recognised in the UK if:
(a) it is effective under the law of the
country in which it was obtained; and
(b) at the relevant date
(i) each party to the marriage was
domiciled in that country; or
(ii) either party to the marriage was
domiciled in that country and the
other party was domiciled in a
country under whose law the
divorce, annulment or legal
separation is recognised as valid;
and
(c) neither party was habitually resident in
the UK for a period of one year prior to
executing the divorce overseas.
Many provisions echo the 1971 Act, such as
s 51 which allows the court discretion to
refuse recognition of a divorce if to do so
would be ‘manifestly contrary to public
policy’. There is also discretion to refuse
recognition of a ‘proceedings’ divorce if the
other party has been deprived of notice or
the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings. Similarly, a non-proceedings
divorce can be denied recognition under
s 46(2) if official documentation as proof of
the divorce is not produced.
Unfair outcomes in cases
The impact of the law on women is clear
from some examples of caselaw in England
and Wales, which illustrate the hardships
faced. For example, through s 46(2)(c)
quoted above , the Act aimed to further
tighten talaq tourism), with the requirement
for non-proceedings divorces that neither
party should be habitually resident in the
UK for a period of one year prior to
commencing the divorce, applying to either
party rather than both, as had previously
been the case in the 1971 Act.
25 R v Secretary of State For the Home Department Ex Parte Fatima [1986] 2 FLR 294
26 Pearl and Menski (n5), p.390
27 HC Deb 24 October 1986 vol 102 cc1440–4 <
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1986/oct/24/family-law-bill-lords#S6CV0102P0_19861024_HOC_
22> accessed 14.02.2021
28 Pearl and Menski (n5) 98
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This provision was considered by the
Immigration Appeal tribunal in a starred
determination in Baig.29 Mr Baig was
refused entry clearance in Pakistan, to join
the sponsor, Ms Batti, in the UK as her
spouse. The issue was whether Ms Batti’s
first marriage in Pakistan was validly
dissolved under s 46 of the Act, having been
carried out by the first husband
pronouncing talaq over the course of a three
month ‘cooling off’ period (talaq al hasan).
The question was therefore whether Ms
Batti was free to marry Mr Baig when she
did. The Tribunal held that the talaq could
not be recognised as the sponsor was
habitually resident in the United Kingdom at
all material times and ‘proceedings’ under
s 46(1) of the Act were not followed, as no
notice was given in accordance with the
Pakistan MFLO1961. Mr Baig’s appeal
failed on the ground that Ms Batti, some 10
years after the talaq, was still married to her
first husband and had, when marrying Mr
Baig, committed bigamy and polyandry. This
case, although correctly applying the current
law, highlights the plight of women stuck in
limping marriages, who genuinely believe
they are divorced, unable to move on with
their lives and faced with the stigma of
being labelled a bigamist.
The effect of the tightening of the law also
reverberated beyond talaq, as recognition
was denied to a transnational Jewish
divorce, a get, in Berkovitz v. Grinberg30
where Wall J remarked as follows:
‘If . . . there is a distinction to be drawn
between a talaq and a get it is a
distinction which Parliament must draw
after a full public debate on all the
questions of policy which arise.
Accordingly, the question as to whether
or not in an increasingly multi-racial
and multi-ethnic society the refusal to
recognise the transnational divorce can
or should continue is a matter for
Parliament and should not influence my
interpretation of the Statute.’31
However, a lack of recent case law shows
the issue of limping marriages or ‘chained
wives’ appears to have abated for Jewish
women. David Frei, a solicitor in this field,
spoke at a faith seminar32 of the Jewish
community being a longer settled
community in Britain compared to Muslims,
and thus having ‘ironed out’ the problem of
limping marriages.33
The constraints of the Act on judicial
discretion was shown in MET v HAT34
where the wife’s claim for interim financial
relief failed. This was due to s 12 of the
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act
1984 (MFPA 1984) which states a party can
apply for financial relief if the marriage has
been dissolved by ‘judicial or other
proceedings’. The court was satisfied that
the husband’s overseas talaq was valid under
the requirments of s 46(2) of the 1986 Act –
a ‘non-proceedings’ divorce, thus denying
the wife the right to apply for financial relief
as she also could not demonstrate a
connection with the jurisdiction. Mostyn J
(as he was then) remarked a follows:
‘I would say, almost parenthetically, that
it is a surprising state of affairs, given
that the Act was brought into effect to
deal with the unfairness which arose
from the pronouncement of talaqs
abroad which may or may not be
proceedings divorces. But, be that as it
may, that is Parliament’s will as
expressed in the Act.’35
29 (n2)
30 Berkovitz v Grinberg (Attorney-General Intervening) [1995] 1 FLR 477.
31 ibid [23] Wall J
32 A Gold and C Bowden ,‘Difficulties Faced by Jewish and Muslim Women When Seeking A Religious Divorce’ (Family
Law Week, 20 July 2017
www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/difficulties-faced-by-jewish-and-muslim-women-when-seeking-a-religious-
divorce#.WwL0C1Mvy9Y > accessed 14.02.2021
33 Frei also states that the Jewish community have utilized s 10A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, inserted by the
Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002, which allows a party to apply to the court to stay grant of a divorce until a
religious divorce is given by the husband. At the time of writing, this provision does not apply to Muslims.
34 MET v HAT [2013] EWHC 4247 (Fam), [2014] 2 FLR 692
35 ibid [11] Mostyn J
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When the wife applied again for financial
relief in MET v HAT (No 2),36 armed with
a new expert’s report, the same judge ruled
a prior talaq by the husband, was a
‘proceedings’ divorce. The judge also utilised
his discretion under s 51(3)(b) that the
husband had produced no evidence of the
claimed non-proceedings divorce, thus
allowing a claim to be made by the wife for
relief under the MPFA 1984. This case
underscores the potential injustice caused by
the Act, where outcomes can depend on
firstly, the opportunity of parties to instruct
an expert witness. Secondly, judges have to
look at the internal standards of the
countries where the divorce was obtained37
contributing to a complication in the law in
that overseas talaqs are now subcategorised
according to the internal legal procedure of
the countries in which they were obtained,
resulting in, for example, ‘Pakistani talaqs’
(which are procedural) compared to
non-procedural, or bare, talaqs, which are
valid according to the law of some Muslim
countries such as Sudan, the Gulf States and
regions such as Azad Kashmir in Pakistan.
Further, the laws of South Asian countries
have developed in the decades since the
Act,38 which further strengthens the case for
reform of English law, discussed below.
‘Ill-informed’ public policy
The underlying policy of the Act has been
flawed. In 1984, the Law Commission
criticised the courts’ approach to the
meaning of ‘judicial and other proceedings’
as restrictive and conflicting39 yet, when the
Act was passed, these findings were ignored.
This has resulted in a lack of certainty,
leading to a reversal in outcomes as in MET
v HAT (No 2)40 and NC41 where in the
latter case, reference was made to Pearl J’s
comment of the Act being based on ‘rather
ill-informed public policy’42.
The problems faced by women who seek to
re-marry as a result of the restrictive
approach introduced by legislation has been
argued to violate their rights to private and
family life under Art 843 and the right to
marry under Art 12 of the ECHR. In
addition, Art 16 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women echoes these provisions and
requires States to ‘take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations’.
There is a strong argument amongst judges
and academics, that limping marriages,
including those arising from transnational
divorces, must be avoided as it is in the
interests of justice, to do so. The rationale
for the existence of private international
law: justice between parties,44 has been
overlooked by successive legislation
spanning decades and, it is argued, has
potentially pushed the problem elsewhere.
The judicial questioning of the policy reason
underlying the Act, indicate how tightening
the law has allowed the courts little leeway
and left parties with unsatisfactory
outcomes. In contrast, the approach in EU
States has been wider, some even argue,
complicated,45 with the courts applying
foreign law and, in some cases, recognising
foreign divorces to avoid limping
marriages.46 The approach in Europe is
categorised by Rohe who identifies a
36 MET v HAT (Interim Maintenance) [2014] EWHC 717 (Fam), [2015] 1 FLR 576
37 K Alidadi , ‘The Western Judicial Answer to Islamic Talaq: Peeking through the Gate of Conflict of Laws in the U.S. and
Belgium’ (2005) 5 UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 1, p.43
38 Pearl and Menski (n5) p.98
39 Law Commission (n6), paras 52 and 6.10
40 (n35)
41 NC (bare talaq – Indian Muslims – recognition) Pakistan [2009] UKAIT 00016)
42 Judge David Pearl , ‘The Application of Islamic Law in the English Courts’ (Noel Coulson Memorial Lecture, Cornell
University, 1995 < https://middleeast.library.cornell.edu/content/application-islamic-law-english-courts > accessed
21/02/2021
43 P Kruiniger, Islamic Divorces in Europe: Bridging the Gap between European and Islamic Legal Orders (1st edition,
Eleven International Publishing, 2014) p.6
44 D McClean and V Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Morris: The Conflict of Laws (8th Ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2012) 6–7
45 ibid 251
46 Alidadi (n36) 75–76.
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‘concrete’ view as protecting women from
limping marriages, and the ‘abstract human
rights approach’ based on the principle of
non-discrimination between genders. There
is a strong argument for reform of the
current law, by adopting the ‘concrete’
position as, as Rohe shows, this is surely a
fair outcome for a woman who consents to
recognition of an overseas divorce and is not
forced to expend time and costs in applying
for a civil divorce.47 This sentiment is also
reflected by Shah, who views the constraints
on judges under the public policy grounds
unhelpful – ‘the judicial sense of justice
based on an evaluation of the situation as
judges might see it in individual cases is
being substituted for a more rigid rule-based
system which is likely to create more, not
fewer, problems in practice’48.
Suggestions for reform
Simplification of the law is required by
removing the distinction between divorces
undertaken through ‘judicial or other
proceedings’ and those that are not. The
lack of clarity of the term ‘judicial or other
proceedings’ in s 54(1) has caused ‘nothing
but confusion’49, since its introduction into
domestic law through the 1971 Act. There
appears to be no valid reason for the
requirement for ‘judicial or other
proceedings’ to continue. The confusion in
the law means outcomes for the parties are
uncertain and depend on the quality of legal
representation and whether a party has the
resources to instruct an expert witness. This
is illustrated in the cases of MET v HAT
(No 2) above, where the parties were
wealthy, compared with NC50 where the
appellant stated an expert opinion was
unaffordable and Mohamoud v ECO, Abu
Dhabi51 an unsuccessful appeal by the
husband of a British Muslim woman, where
the court did not have the benefit of expert
evidence on the validity of a bare talaq in
the UAE. The need for a more just approach
is also supported by many who call for a
more pluralistic approach to family law in
order to attain ‘situation-specific justice’52.
This can be achieved foremost, by a return
to case-by-case consideration which existed
before the Act. A removal of the ‘blanket
ban’ in the Act is required and a
continuation of judicial discretion on public
policy and fairness grounds. Each matter
would be decided on a case-by-case basis,
involving a balancing exercise as to whether
it is in the public interest for a limping
marriage to continue.
Conclusion
To conclude, the policy of the Act, to
protect women from extra-judicial divorce,
has clearly failed as some women wish to
follow both secular and religious divorce
laws. Despite having secured a civil divorce,
women are seeking religious divorces from
sharia councils.53 With respect to foreign
divorces, it is argued that the persistence of
the problem of limping marriages is a
stronger argument against the public interest
than the potential gender discrimination
resulting from a bare talaq. The Act has
clearly created unfairness for women as the
problem appears to have been pushed
elsewhere and some women may, under the
civil law, be stuck in limping marriages. At
worst, they are labelled bigamists. The
problem has been festering for decades;
some groups, like the Jewish community,
have found solutions. Others still suffer
from a lack of recognition of the overseas
divorce.
The author is grateful to Dr Helena Wray,
University of Exeter for her comments. Any
errors are the author’s own.
47 M Rohe ‘Family and the Law in Europe: Bringing Together Secular Legal Orders and Religious Norms and Needs’ (n9)
p.63–65
48 P Shah (n15) 7
49 S Nott, ‘Judicial and Other Proceedings’: The Story So Far’ in International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol 34
[1985] No. 4 838
50 (n40) para 11
51 UT(IAC), Unreported, OA/13118/2012, 29.11.13
52 W Menski, ‘Plurality-Conscious Rebalancing of Family Law Regulation’; M Jänterä-Jareborg, ‘Cross-border Family
Cases and Religious Diversity: What Can Judges Do?’ in Shah and others (n9)
53 ( n8) 164, 234 Uddin’s research found that eleven out of fifteen participants, who had undergone a civil divorce,
desired/needed a religious divorce from the sharia councils.
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